qualities of a great general". This will have to be interpreted as follows: "whatever \( f \) may be, if \( x \) was a great general implies \( fx \), whatever \( x \) may be, then \( f(\text{Napoleon}) \). This seems to imply giving a substantiality to \( f \) which we should like to avoid if we could. I think the difficulty real, and I do not know the answer. We certainly cannot do without variables that represent predicates or relation-words, but my feeling is that a technical device should be possible which would preserve the differences of ontological status between what is meant by names, on the one hand, and predicates and relation-words, on the other.

What mathematical logic does is not to establish ontological status where it might be doubted, but rather to diminish the number of words which have the straight-forward meaning of pointing to an object. It used to be a common view that all the integers were entities, and those who would not go so far as this were at least persuaded that the number 1 is an entity. We cannot prove that this is not the case, but we can prove that mathematics affords no evidence for it.

Finally, the question "Are there universals?" is ambiguous. In some interpretations, the answer is certainly "yes"; in others, no decisive answer seems possible at present. What I have to say about the ontological status of universals is contained in the last chapter of *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*.

BERTRAND RUSSELL

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NOTES ON LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

IN the spring of 1914 Bertrand Russell came to Harvard as a visiting lecturer. One of his two courses was on logic, and I was assigned to assist him with it. He was late in arriving, and I gave two or three weeks of lectures, mostly on how to read the symbolism of the *Principia Mathematica*. His lectures also largely followed the *Principia*. He assigned Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to be read—in German. He also had with him some notes and excerpts, giving the opinions of a brilliant student of his, named Ludwig Wittgenstein, who had been recommended by Frege to come to him. I copied this manuscript, dated September, 1913.

It is Wittgenstein's theory of that time about propositions. I may say, as a first approximation of my own, a proposition is not the words of a statement, but it is *what the statement says*. It is the same proposition, whether it is asserted or denied, believed, con-
sidered, referred to, emoted over. In a sense it is intended as a description of fact, but you can understand it without knowing the fact, if you know what would be the case if the proposition were true, and what the case if it were false. It always has a contradictory, only one of them true, the other false. It and its contradictory have a complementary “sense” (Sinn), and the same “meaning” (Bedeutung), the meaning being the external fact, the fact meant, and they have only one fact between them. The two thus referring to the same fact, says Wittgenstein, are really only one proposition with two poles. You are able to verify the proposition as true when you observe that the pole you have asserted fits the fact. But it remains the statement of two alternative possibilities, of which you now know which alternative is true. The verified proposition is still double and symbolic, and does not fuse with the corresponding fact and disappear—as it did, for instance, in Royce’s Hegelian “inner meaning and outer meaning of an idea.” If you deny a proposition instead of asserting it, you reverse the polarity, and two such denials bring you back where you started. Russell indicated this on the blackboard by an arrow, which you might reverse and reverse again.

Wittgenstein’s own ab-notation for the duality is puzzling in this paper, because used without much explanation. In 1914 I drew matrix diagrams on the margin of my transcript to illustrate the discussion of true-false “molecular” propositions, combinations of propositions connected by “or,” “and,” “if-then,” the conjunctions all of which had just been reduced by Sheffer to repetitions of his “stroke-relation.” Russell had drawn the conclusion that there is no “or” in the objective world, so in general there is nothing to correspond to these molecular propositions in the outer world of facts, nor to any other conjunction, so this theory is, as regards facts, a “logical atomism.”

In these days, when the Russell Analysts, and the Wittgenstein Semanticists confront one another almost as hostile camps, this present document from the time of common origins has taken on a renewed importance.

HARRY T. COSTELLO

PRELIMINARY

In philosophy there are no deductions; it is purely descriptive. The word “philosophy” ought always to designate something over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences. Philosophy gives no pictures of reality, and can neither confirm nor confute scientific investigations. It consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its
basis. Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology. Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing. Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions (not primitive propositions only). A correct explanation of the logical propositions must give them a unique position as against all other propositions.

I. Bi-polarity of Propositions. Sense and Meaning. Truth and Falsehood

Frege said "propositions are names"; Russell said "propositions correspond to complexes". Both are false; and especially false is the statement "propositions are names of complexes". Facts cannot be named. The false assumption that propositions are names leads us to believe there must be "logical objects": for the meaning of logical propositions would have to be such things.

What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends upon whether it is true or false. But we must be able to understand a proposition without knowing if it is true or false. What we know when we understand a proposition is this: we know what is the case if it is true and what is the case if it is false. But we do not necessarily know whether it is actually true or false.

Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call this the sense of a proposition. The meaning of a proposition is the fact which actually corresponds to it. The chief characteristic of my theory is: \( p \) has the same meaning as not-\( p \) (constituent = particular, component = particular or relation, etc.).

Neither the sense nor the meaning of a proposition is a thing. These words are incomplete symbols. It is clear that we understand propositions without knowing whether they are true or false. But we can only know the meaning of a proposition when we know if it is true or false. What we understand is the sense of the proposition. To understand a proposition \( p \) it is not enough to know that \( p \) implies "\( p \) is true", but we must also know that \( \sim p \) implies "\( p \) is false". This shows the bi-polarity of the proposition. We understand a proposition when we understand its constituents and forms. If we know the meaning of "\( a \)" and "\( b \)" and if we know what "\( xRy \)" means for all \( x \)'s and \( y \)'s, then we also understand "\( aRb \)". I understand the proposition "\( aRb \)" when I know that either the fact that \( aRb \) or the fact that not \( aRb \) corresponds to it; but this is not to be confused with the false opinion that I understand "\( aRb \)" when I know that "\( aRb \) or not \( aRb \)" is the case.

Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say we understand the proposition \( p \) when we know that "\( p \) is true" \( \equiv p \); for this would
naturally always be the case if accidentally the propositions to right and left of the symbol $\equiv$ were either both true or both false. We require not only an equivalence but a formal equivalence, which is bound up with the introduction of the form of $p$. What is wanted is the formal equivalence with respect to the forms of the proposition, i.e., all the general indefinables involved.

There are positive and negative facts: if the proposition "This rose is not red" is true, then what it signifies is negative. But the occurrence of the word "not" does not indicate this unless we know that the signification of the proposition "This rose is red" (when it is true) is positive. It is only from both, the negation and the negated proposition, that we can conclude about a characteristic of the signification of the whole proposition. (We are not here speaking of the negations of general propositions, i.e., of such as contain apparent variables. Negative facts only justify the negations of atomic propositions.) Positive and negative facts there are, but not true and false facts.

If we overlook the fact that propositions have a sense which is independent of their truth or falsehood, it easily seems as if true and false were two equally justified relations between the sign and what is signified. (We might then say, e.g., that "$q$" signifies in the true way what "not-$q$" signifies in the false way.) But are not true and false in fact equally justified? Could we not express ourselves by means of false propositions just as well as hitherto with true ones, so long as we know that they are meant falsely? No, for a proposition is true when it is as we assert in the proposition; and accordingly if by "$q$" we mean "not-$q$", and it is as we mean to assert, then in the new interpretation "$q$" is actually true and not false. But it is important that we can mean the same by "$q$" as by "not-$q$", for it shows that neither to the symbol "not" nor to the manner of its combination with "$q$" does a characteristic of the denotation of "$q$" correspond.

An analogy for the theory of truth: Consider a black patch on white paper. Then we can describe the form of the patch by mentioning, for each point of the surface, whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black) corresponds a negative fact. If I designate a point of the surface (one of Frege's "truth-values"), this is as if I set up an assumption to be decided upon. But in order to be able to say of a point that it is black or it is white, I must first know when a point is to be called black and when it is to be called white. In order to be able to say that "$p$" is true (or false), I must first have determined under what circumstances I call a proposition true, and thereby I determine the sense of a proposi-
tion. The point in which the analogy fails is this: I can indicate a point of the paper which is white and black, but to a proposition without sense nothing corresponds, for it does not designate a thing (truth-value) whose properties might be called "false" or "true". The verb of a proposition is not "is true" or "is false", as Frege believes, but what is true must already contain the verb.

The comparison of language and reality is like that of a retinal image and visual image: to the blind spot nothing in the visual image seems to correspond, and thereby the boundaries of the blind spot determine the visual image—just as true negations of atomic propositions determine reality.

One is tempted to interpret "not-p" as "everything else, only not p". That from a single fact p an infinity of others, not not-p, etc., follow is hardly credible. Man possesses an innate capacity for constructing symbols with which some sense can be expressed without having the slightest idea what each word signifies. The best example of this is mathematics, for man has until recently used the symbols for numbers without knowing what they signify or that they signify nothing.

The assertion sign is logically quite without significance. It only shows, in Frege and in Whitehead and Russell, that these authors hold the propositions so indicated to be true. "├", therefore, belongs as little to the proposition as (say) the number of the proposition. A proposition cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true. Assertion is merely psychological. There are only unasserted propositions. Judgment, command, and question all stand on the same level; but all have in common the propositional form, and that alone interests us. What interests logic are only the unasserted propositions.

When we say A judges that, etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition which A judges. It will not do either to mention only its constituents, or its constituents and form but not in the proper order. This shows that a proposition itself must occur in the statement to the effect that it is judged. For instance, however "not-p" may be explained, the question "What is negated?" must have a meaning. In "A judges (that) p", p cannot be replaced by a proper name. This is apparent if we substitute "A judges that p is true and not-p is false". The proposition "A judges (that) p" consists of the proper name A, the proposition p with its two poles, and A's being related to both these poles in a certain way. This is obviously not a relation in the ordinary sense. Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that "this table penholders the book" (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement). The structure of the proposition must be recognized
and then the rest is easy. But ordinary language conceals the structure of the proposition: in it relations look like predicates, and predicates like names, etc.

One reason for supposing that not all propositions which have more than one argument are relational propositions is that, if they were, the relations of judgment and inference would have to hold between an arbitrary number of things. The idea that propositions are names for complexes has suggested that whatever is not a proper name is a sign for a relation. Russell, for instance, imagines every fact as a spatial complex, and since spatial complexes consist of things and relations only, therefore he holds all do.

We are very often inclined to explanations of logical functions of propositions which aim at introducing into the function either only the constituents of these propositions, or only their form, etc., and we overlook the fact that ordinary language would not contain the whole propositions if it did not need them.

Names are points, propositions arrows—they have sense. The sense of a proposition is determined by the two poles true and false. The form of a proposition is like a straight line, which divides all points of a plane into right and left. The line does this automatically, the form of the proposition only by convention. It is wrong to conceive every proposition as expressing a relation. A natural attempt at such a solution consists in regarding “not–p” as the opposite of “p”, where, then, “opposite” would be the indefinable relation. But it is easy to see that every such attempt to replace functions with sense (ab functions) by descriptions, must fail.

When we say “A believes p”, this sounds, it is true, as if we could here substitute a proper name for “p”. But we can see that here a sense, not a meaning, is concerned, if we say “A believes that p is true”, and in order to make the direction of p even more explicit, we might say “A believes that ‘p’ is true and ‘not–p’ is false”. Here the bi-polarity of p is expressed, and it seems that we shall only be able to express the proposition “A believes p” correctly by the ab notation (later explained) by, say, making “A” have a relation to the poles “a” and “b” of a–p–b. The epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved without a correct apprehension of the form of the proposition.

A proposition is a standard with reference to which facts behave, but with names it is otherwise. Just as one arrow behaves to another arrow by being in the same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a proposition; it is thus bi-polarity and sense come in. In this theory p has the same meaning as not–p but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. A proper theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense. The “sense of” an ab function of
a proposition is a function of its sense. In not \(- p\), \( p \) is exactly the same as if it stands alone (this point is absolutely fundamental). Among the facts which make "\( p \) or \( q \)" true there are also facts which make "\( p \) and \( q \)" true; hence, if propositions have only meaning, we ought, in such a case, to say that these two propositions are identical. But in fact their sense is different, and we have introduced sense by talking of all \( p \)'s and all \( q \)'s. Consequently the molecular propositions will only be used in cases where their \( ab \) function stands under a generality sign or enters into another function such as "I believe that", etc., because then the sense enters.

II. Analysis of Atomic Propositions. General Indefinables, Predicates, etc.

It may be doubted whether, if we formed all possible atomic propositions, "the world would be completely described if we declared the truth or falsehood of each" (Russell).

If there were a world created in which the principles of logic were true, in that world the whole of mathematics holds. No world can be created in which a proposition is true, unless the constituents of the proposition are created also.

Indefinables are of two sorts: names and forms. Propositions cannot consist of names alone, they cannot be classes of names. A name cannot only occur in two different propositions, but can occur in the same way in both. Propositions, which are symbols having reference to facts, are themselves facts (that this inkpot is on this table may express that I sit in this chair). We must be able to understand propositions we have never heard before. But every proposition is a new symbol. Hence we must have general indefinable symbols; these are unavoidable if propositions are not all indefinable. Only the doctrine of general indefinables permits us to understand the nature of functions. Neglect of this doctrine leads us to an impenetrable thicket.

A proposition must be understood when all its indefinables are understood. The indefinables in "\( aRb \)" are introduced as follows: (1) "\( a \)" is indefinable, (2) "\( b \)" is indefinable, (3) whatever "\( x \)" and "\( y \)" may mean, "\( xRy \)" says something indefinable about their meaning.

We are not concerned in logic with the relation of any specific name to its meaning and just as little with the relation of a given proposition to reality. We do want to know that our names have meanings and propositions sense, and we thus introduce an indefinable concept "\( A \)" by saying "\( 'A' \) denotes something indefinable", or the form of propositions \( aRb \) by saying: "For all meanings of '\( x \)' and '\( y \)', '\( xRy \)' expresses something indefinable about \( x \) and \( y \)."
The form of a proposition may be symbolized in the following way: Let us consider symbols of the form “xRy”, to which correspond primarily pairs of objects of which one has the name “x”, the other the name “y”. The x’s and y’s stand in various relations to each other, and among other relations the relation R holds between some but not between others. I now determine the sense of “xRy” by laying down the rule: when the facts behave in regard to “xRy” so that the meaning of “x” stands in the relation R to the meaning of “y”, then I say that these facts are “of like sense” (gleichsinnig) with the proposition “xRy”; otherwise, “of opposite sense” (entgegengesetzt). I correlate the facts to the symbol “xRy” by thus dividing them into those of like sense and those of opposite sense. To this correlation corresponds the correlation of name and meaning. Both are psychological. Thus I understand the form “xRy” when I know that it discriminates the behavior of x and y according as these stand in the relation R or not. In this way I extract from all possible relations the relation R, as by a name, I extract its meaning from among all possible things.

There is no thing which is the form of a proposition, and no name which is the name of a form. Accordingly we can also not say that a relation which in certain cases holds between things holds sometimes between forms and things. This goes against Russell’s theory of judgment.

Symbols are not what they seem to be. In “aRb” “R” looks like a substantive but it is not one. What is symbolized in “aRb” is that R occurs between a and b. Hence “R” is not the indefinable in “aRb”. Similarly in “ϕx” “ϕ” looks like a substantive but is not one; in “∼p”, “∼” looks like “q” but is not like it. This is the first thing that indicates there may not be logical constants. A reason against them is the generality of logic: logic cannot treat a special set of things.

Russell’s “complexes” were to have the useful property of being compounded, and were to combine with this the agreeable property that they could be treated like “simples”. But this alone makes them unserviceable as logical types (forms), since there would then have been significance in asserting, of a simple, that it was complex. But a property cannot be a logical type.

A false theory of relations makes it easily seem as if the relation of fact and constituent were the same as that of fact and fact-which-follows-from-it. But there is a similarity of the two, expressible thus: ϕa ⊇ φa.a = a.

Every statement about complexes can be resolved into the logical sum of a statement about the constituents and a statement about the proposition which describes the complex completely. How, in
each case, the resolution is to be made, is an important question, but its answer is not unconditionally necessary for the construction of logic. To repeat: every proposition which seems to be about a complex can be analyzed into a proposition about its constituents and about the proposition which describes the complex perfectly; i.e., that proposition which is equivalent to saying the complex exists.

III. Analysis of Molecular Propositions: \(ab\) Functions

Whatever corresponds in reality to compound propositions must not be more than what corresponds to their several atomic propositions. Molecular propositions contain nothing beyond what is contained in their atoms; they add no material information above that contained in their atoms. All that is essential about molecular functions is their T-F (true-false) schema (i.e., the statement of the cases where they are true and cases where they are false). It is \textit{a priori} likely that the introduction of atomic propositions is fundamental for the understanding of all other kinds of propositions. In fact, the understanding of general propositions obviously depends on that of atomic propositions.

One reason for thinking the old notation wrong is that it is very unlikely that from every proposition \(p\), an infinite number of other propositions \(\neg\neg p\), \(\neg\neg\neg p\), etc., should follow. The very possibility of Frege’s explanations of “\(\neg p\)” and “if \(p\) then \(q\)”, from which it follows that “\(\neg\neg p\)” denotes the same as \(p\), makes it probable that there is some method of designation in which “\(\neg\neg p\)” corresponds to the same symbol as “\(p\)”. But if this method of designation suffices for logic, it must be the right one. If \(p = \neg\neg p\), etc., this shows that the traditional method of symbolization is wrong, since it allows a plurality of symbols with the same sense; and thence it follows that in analyzing such propositions, we must not be guided by Russell’s method of symbolizing.

Naming is like pointing. A function is like a line dividing points of a plane into right and left ones; then “\(p\) or \(\neg p\)” has no meaning because it does not divide the plane. But though a particular proposition, “\(p\) or \(\neg p\)”, has no meaning, a general proposition, “For all \(p\)’s, \(p\) or \(\neg p\)”, has a meaning, because this does not contain the nonsensical function “\(p\) or \(\neg p\)”, but the function “\(p\) or \(\neg q\)”, just as “for all \(x\)’s, \(xRx\)” contains the function “\(xRy\)”.

Logical inferences can, it is true, be made in accordance with Frege’s or Russell’s laws of deduction, but this cannot justify the inference; and therefore they are not primitive propositions of logic. If \(p\) follows from \(q\), it can also be inferred from \(q\), and the “manner of deduction” is indifferent.

The reason why “\(\sim\) Socrates” means nothing is that “\(\sim x\)” does
not express a property of \( x \). Signs of the forms \( p \lor \neg p \) are
senseless, but not the proposition \( (p) p \lor \neg p \). If I know that
this rose is either red or not red, I know nothing. The same holds
of all \( ab \) functions. The assumption of the existence of logical
objects makes it appear remarkable that in the sciences propositions
of the form \( p \lor q \), \( p \supset q \), etc., are only then not provisional
when \( \lor \) and \( \supset \) stand within the scope of a generality-sign
(apparent variable). That \( \lor \) and \( \neg \), etc., are not relations
in the same sense as \( \text{"right"} \) and \( \text{"left"} \), etc., is obvious to the plain
man. The possibility of cross-definition in the old logical indefinables
shows, of itself, that these are not the right indefinables, and
even more conclusively, that they do not denote relations. Logical
indefinables cannot be predicates or relations, because propositions,
owing to sense, cannot have predicates or relations. Nor are \( \neg \)
and \( \lor \), like judgment, \textit{analogous} to predicates and relations,
because they do not introduce anything new.

In place of every proposition \( p \) let us write \( \# p \). Let every
correlation of propositions to each other or of names to propositions
be effected by a correlation of their poles \( a \) and \( b \). Let this
correlation be transitive. Then accordingly \( \# p \) is the same
symbol as \( \# p \). Let \( n \) propositions be given. I then call a \textit{class}
of poles of these propositions every class of \( n \) members, of which
each is a pole of one of the \( n \) propositions, so that one member
corresponds to each proposition. I then correlate with each class
of poles one of two poles (\( a \) and \( b \)). The sense of the symbolizing
fact thus constructed I cannot define, but I know it.

The sense of an \( ab \) function of \( p \) is a function of the sense of \( p \).
The \( ab \) functions use the discrimination of facts which their argu-
ments bring forth in order to generate new discriminations. The \( ab 
notation shows the dependence of \( or \) and \( not \), and thereby that they
are not to be employed as simultaneous indefinables.

To every molecular function a TF (or \( ab \)) scheme corresponds.
Therefore we may use the TF scheme itself instead of the function.
Now what the TF scheme does is that it correlates the letters T
and F with each proposition. These two letters are the poles of atomic
propositions. Then the scheme correlates another T and F to
these poles. In this notation all that matters is the correlation of
the outside poles to the poles of the atomic propositions. Therefore
\( \neg \# p \) is the same symbol as \( p \). And therefore we shall never
get two symbols for the same molecular function. As the \( ab \) (TF)
functions of atomic propositions are bi-polar propositions again,
we can perform \( ab \) operations on them. We shall, by doing so, correlate
two new outside poles via the old outside poles to the poles of the
atomic propositions.
The symbolizing fact in $a \rightarrow p \leftarrow b$ is that say $a$ is on the left of $p$ and $b$ on the right of $p$. [This is quite arbitrary, but if we once have fixed on which order the poles have to stand in, we must of course stick to our convention. If, for instance, "apb" says $p$, then $bp$ says nothing (it does not say $\sim p$). But $a \rightarrow a \rightarrow p \leftarrow b$ is the same symbol as $apb$ (here the $ab$ function vanishes automatically) for here the new poles are related to the same side of $p$ as the old ones. The question is always: how are the new poles correlated to $p$ compared with the way the old poles are correlated to $p$?] Then, given $apb$, the correlation of new poles is to be transitive, so that, for instance, if a new pole $a$ in whatever way, i.e., via whatever poles, is correlated to the inside $a$, the symbol is not changed thereby. It is therefore possible to construct all possible $ab$ functions by performing one $ab$ operation repeatedly, and we can therefore talk of all $ab$ functions as of all those functions which can be obtained by performing this $ab$ operation repeatedly (cf., Sheffer's work).

Among the facts which make "$p$ or $q$" true, there are some which make "$p$ and $q$" true; but the class which makes "$p$ or $q$" true is different from the class which makes "$p$ and $q$" true; and only this is what matters. For we introduce this class, as it were, when we introduce $ab$ functions.

Since the $ab$ functions of $p$ are again bi-polar propositions, we can form $ab$-functions of them, and so on. In this way a series of propositions will arise, in which, in general, the symbolizing facts will be the same in several members. If now we find an $ab$ function of such a kind that by repeated applications of it every $ab$-function can be generated, then we can introduce the totality of $ab$-functions as the totality of those that are generated by the application of this function. Such a function is $\sim p \lor \sim q$. It is easy to suppose a contradiction in the fact that, on the one hand, every possible complex proposition is a simple $ab$ function of simple propositions, and that, on the other hand, the repeated application of one $ab$ function suffices to generate all these propositions. If, e.g., an affirmation can be generated by double negation, is negation in any sense contained in affirmation? Does "$p$" deny "not--$p$" or assert "$p$", or both? And how do matters stand with the definition of "$\lor$" by "$\lor$" and ".", or of "$\lor$" by "." and "$\lor$"? And how, e.g., shall we introduce $p \mid q$ (i.e., $\sim p \lor \sim q$), if not by saying that this expression says something indefinable about all arguments $p$ and $q$? But the $ab$-functions must be introduced as follows: The function $p \mid q$ is merely a mechanical instrument for constructing all possible symbols of $ab$-functions. The symbols arising by repeated application of the symbol "$\mid$" do not contain the symbol "$p \mid q$". We need a rule according to which we can form all symbols of $ab$ functions,
in order to be able to speak of the class of them; and we now speak of them, e.g., as those symbols of functions which can be generated by repeated application of the operation "\( \lnot \)". And we say now: For all \( p \)'s and \( q \)'s, "\( p \lvert q \)" says something indefinable about the sense of those simple propositions which are contained in \( p \) and \( q \).

IV. ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

Just as people used to struggle to bring all propositions into the subject-predicate form, so now it is natural to conceive every proposition as expressing a relation, which is just as incorrect. What is justified in this desire is fully satisfied by Russell's theory of manufactured relations.

If only those signs which contain proper names are complex, then propositions containing nothing but apparent variables would be simple. Then what about their denials? Propositions are always complex, even if they contain no names.

There are no propositions containing real variables. Those symbols which are called propositions in which "variables occur" are in reality not propositions at all, but only schemes of propositions, which do not become propositions unless we replace the variables by constants. There is no proposition which is expressed by "\( x = x' \)", for "\( x \)" has no signification. But there is a proposition "\( (x).x = x' \)", and propositions such as "Socrates = Socrates", etc. In books on logic no variables ought to occur, but only general propositions which justify the use of variables. It follows that the so-called definitions in logic are not definitions, but only schemes of definitions, and instead of these we ought to put general propositions.

And similarly, the so-called primitive ideas (Urzeichen) of logic are not primitive ideas but schemes of them. The mistaken idea that there are things called facts or complexes and relations easily leads to the opinion that there must be a relation of questioning to the facts, and then the question arises whether a relation can hold between an arbitrary number of things, since a fact can follow from arbitrary causes. It is a fact that the proposition which, e.g., expresses that \( q \) follows from \( p \) and \( p \supset q \) is this: \( p \supset q \supset p.q.q \).

Cross-definability in the realm of general propositions leads to quite similar questions to those in the realm of \( ab \) functions. There is the same objection in the case of apparent variables to the usual indefinables as in the case of molecular functions. The application of the \( ab \) notation to apparent variable propositions becomes clear if we consider that, for instance, the proposition "for all \( x \), \( \phi x \)" is to be true when \( \phi x \) is true for all \( x \)'s, and false when \( \phi x \) is false for some \( x \)'s. We see that some and all occur simultaneously in the

\[ ^{1} \text{"A relation of a relation to the facts"—H.T.C.} \]
proper apparent variable notation. The notation is

for \((x)\phi x\): \(a = (x).a \phi x b.-(\exists x) b\) and
for \((\exists x)\phi x\): \(a = (\exists x).a \phi x b.-(x) b\)

Old definitions now become tautologous.

A very natural objection to the way in which I have introduced, e.g., propositions of the form \(xRy\) is that by it propositions such as \((3x,y)xRy\) and similar ones are not explained, which, yet obviously have in common with \(aRb\) what \(cRd\) has in common with \(aRb\). But when we introduce propositions of the form \(xRy\) we mentioned no one particular proposition of this form; and we only need to introduce \((x,y)\phi(x,y)\) for all \(\phi\)'s in any way which makes the sense of these propositions dependent on the sense of all propositions of the form \(\phi(a,b)\), and thereby the justification of our procedure is established.


It is easy to suppose only such symbols are complex as contain names of objects, and that accordingly "\((x,\phi).\phi x\)" or "\((3x,y)xRy\)" must be simple. It is then natural to call the first of these the name of a form, the second the name of a relation. But in that case what is the meaning, e.g., of "\(\sim(3x,y).xRy\)"? Can we put "not" before a name?

Alternate indefinability shows the indefinables have not yet been reached. The indefinables of logic must be independent of each other. If an indefinable is introduced, it must be introduced in all combinations in which it can occur. We cannot, therefore, introduce it first for one combination, then for another; e.g., if the form \(xRy\) has been introduced, it must henceforth be understood in propositions of the form \(aRb\) just in the same way as in propositions such as \((3xy).xRy\) and others. We must not introduce it first for one class of cases, then for the other; for it would remain doubtful if its meaning was the same in both cases and there could be no ground for using the same manner of combining symbols in both cases. In short, for the introduction of indefinable symbols and combinations of symbols the same holds, mutatis mutandis, that Frege has said for the introduction of symbols by definitions.

It is impossible to dispense with propositions in which the same argument occurs in different positions. It is obviously useless to replace \(\phi(a,a)\) by \(\phi(a,b)\). \(a = b\).

It can never express the common characteristic of two objects that we designate them by the same name but otherwise by two different ways of designation, for, since names are arbitrary, we
might also choose different names, and where, then, would be
the common element in the designations? Nevertheless, one is
always tempted, in a difficulty, to take refuge in different ways of
designation.

It is to be remembered that names are not things but classes:
"A" is the same letter as "A". This has the most important conse-
quences for every symbolic language.

In regard to notation it is important to observe that not every
feature of a symbol symbolizes. In two molecular functions which
have the same T-F scheme, what symbolizes must be the same. In
"not-\neg p", \neg p does not occur; for \neg-\neg p is the same
as \neg p, and therefore, if \neg p occurred in \neg-\neg p, it
would occur in \neg p.

A complex symbol must never be introduced as a single inde-
finable. Thus, for instance, no proposition is indefinable. For if
one of the parts of the complex symbol occurs also in another con-
nection, it must there be reintroduced. And would it then mean
the same? The ways in which we introduce our indefinables must
permit us to construct all propositions that have sense from these
indefinables alone. It is easy to introduce "all" and "some" in a
way that will make the construction of (say) "(x,y).xRy" possible
from "all" and "xRy" as introduced before.

One must not say "The complex sign 'aRb'" says that a stands
in the relation R to b; but that "a" stands in a certain relation to
"b" says that aRb.

Only facts can express sense, a class of names cannot. This is
easily shown. In aRb it is not the complex that symbolizes but the
fact that the symbol a stands in a certain relation to the symbol b.
Thus facts are symbolized by facts, or more correctly: that a certain
thing is the case in the symbol says that a certain thing is the case
in the world.

VI. Types

No proposition can say anything about itself, because the symbol
of the proposition cannot be contained in itself; this must be the
basis of the theory of logical types.

It is easy to suppose that "individual", "particular", "complex",
etc., are primitive ideas of logic. Russell, e.g., says "individual"
and "matrix" are "primitive ideas". This error is presumably to
be explained by the fact that, by employment of variables instead of
the generality sign, it comes to seem as if logic dealt with things
which have been deprived of all properties except complexity. We
forget that the indefinables of symbols (Ur bilder von Zeichen) only
occur under the generality sign, never outside it.
Every proposition which says something indefinite about a thing is a subject-predicate proposition; every proposition which says something indefinite about two things expresses a dual relation between these things, and so on. Thus every proposition which contains only one name and one indefinite form is a subject-predicate proposition, etc. An indefinite symbol can only be a name, and therefore we can know, by the symbol of an atomic proposition, whether it is a subject-predicate proposition.

A proposition cannot occur in itself. This is the fundamental truth of the theory of types. In a proposition convert all indefinables into variables, there then remains a class of propositions which does not include all propositions, but does include an entire type. If we change a constituent \(a\) of a proposition \(\phi(a)\) into a variable, then there is a class \(\phi(x) = p\). This class, in general, still depends upon what, by an arbitrary convention, we mean by "\(\phi x\)". But if we change into variables all those symbols whose significance was arbitrarily determined, there is still such a class. But this is not now dependent upon any convention, but only upon the nature of the symbol "\(\phi x\)". It corresponds to a logical type.

There are two ways in which signs are similar. The names Socrates and Plato are similar: they are both names. But whatever they have in common must not be introduced before Socrates and Plato are introduced. The same applies to a subject-predicate form, etc. Therefore, thing, proposition, subject-predicate form, etc., are not indefinables, i.e., types are not indefinables.

Every proposition that says something indefinite about one thing is a subject-predicate proposition, etc. Therefore, we can recognize a subject-predicate proposition if we know it contains only one name and one form, etc. This gives the construction of types. Hence the type of a proposition can be recognized by its symbol alone.

What is essential in a correct apparent-variable notation is this: (1) it must mention a type of proposition, (2) it must show which components (forms and constituents) of a proposition of this type are constants. Take \((\phi).\phi!x\). Then if we describe the kind of symbols for which \(\phi\) stands, the which, by the above, is enough to determine the type, then automatically "\((\phi).\phi!x\)" cannot be fitted by this description, because it contains "\(\phi!x\)" and the description is to describe all that symbolizes in symbols of the \(\phi!x\) kind. If the description is thus completed, vicious circles can just as little occur as can for instance \((\phi).(x)\phi\) where \((x)\phi\) is a subject-predicate proposition.

We can never distinguish one logical type from another by attributing a property to members of the one which we deny to
members of the other. Types can never be distinguished from each other by saying (as is currently done) that one has these but the other has those properties, for this presupposes that there is a meaning in asserting all these properties of both types. And, from this it follows that, at least, these properties may be types, but certainly not the objects of which they are asserted.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

SEPTEMBER, 1913

LOGIC IN 1914 AND NOW

ONE of my kindlier reviewers has called me a somewhat dated product of the gas-light era at Harvard. My present historical excursion is not one of sentimental reminiscence. I would not want to go back to 1914—for one thing because it was too much like the present. Bradley and Bergson from different sides were critical of rationalism. Few wanted to be idealists, except at Cornell, where Creighton wrote me, "We do not stand for any -isms, but for the great traditions of philosophy." Ralph Barton Perry asked me if I did not think Royce was trying to forget the Absolute, in favor of a new social philosophy inspired by Peirce, in which we, separate individuals, get to know one another's minds by interpreting one another's symbols. Mead was thinking along the same lines as Royce, and Dewey also, for Dewey was an educator. The pragmatist effort to get away from verbalism had led to such a noisy controversy that everybody was out of breath. I and my fellow students were interested in epistemology. I was reading a variety of authors, such as Dawes Hicks, and the early epistemological papers of Samuel Alexander. Bertrand Russell, from the other side of the ocean, was looking for suggestions from here, and getting out of James points for his theory of perspectives which seemed to me contrary to what James or Perry meant. The deeper currents, though we did not see it, were beginning to run strongly towards naturalism and behaviorism. Santayana, a materialist, thought, wrongly, he stood alone. In epistemology the New Realists were looking for a new way of understanding knowledge, and when the Critical Realists temporarily got together in the '20s, I for one thought them reactionary, and said, "We've tried that before, it is back to the old squirrel cage." Symbolic logic excited little interest, and for economic reasons I had to give up teaching it—to classes of three.

In the spring of 1914 Russell came to Harvard, and lectured on